The FIA announced in the days after the title duel between Max Verstappen and Lewis Hamilton that it would launch a full investigation, which has been carried out for the past three months.
On the eve of the 2022 season, the FIA published an executive summary of the report, detailing what happened in Abu Dhabi and offering recommendations.
FIA Executive Summary Report
Executive summary of the analysis and clarification exercise carried out by the FIA after the 2021 Abu Dhabi Grand Prix.
Introduction
This report has been written to present to the WMSC members the conclusions derived from the analysis of the events that took place during the last five laps of the Abu Dhabi Grand Prix scoring for the 2021 FIA Formula 1 World Championship. The aim of this report is to draw any lessons from this situation and to provide clarity to participants, media and fans about the current regulations to preserve the competitive nature of our sport while ensuring rider safety. and officers.
I. THE FACTS
A) Events on the track
1. On December 12, 2021, on lap 53/58 of the Abu Dhabi Grand Prix race held at the Yas Marina Circuit in the United Arab Emirates (the Abu Dhabi Grand Prix), the last scoring competition for the 2021 FIA Formula One World Championship, Nicholas Latifi ( Williams Racing ) crashed into the barrier at the exit of Turn 14 at 18:21:37 local time. The stewards had to remove the car and its remains from the track. At that time, the running order was as follows: #1. Lewis Hamilton (HAM), Mercedes-AMG Petronas F1 Team (Mercedes); #two. Max Verstappen (SEE), Red Bull Racing Honda (Red Bull) and #3. Sergio Perez, Red Bull. Track marshals immediately showed double yellow flags in that sector.
2. At the time of the accident, both HAM and VER were driving with hard compound tires, each having previously changed tires. At 18:21:54 local time, the safety car was brought out onto the track by race management. VER pitted to change soft compound tyres. HAM stayed on track on hard compound tires behind the safety car. Once the grid was under control behind the safety car, the withdrawal of N. Latifi’s car began. The speed of the retreat was, however, slower than anticipated, partly because the car’s brakes had caught fire. On lap 55/58, the retreat and cleanup of the incident continued.
3. At 18:27:55 local time, with the race on lap 56/58 and the safety car still on the track, as marshals were still removing a significant amount of car wreckage from the track , the standard message “DOUBLE CARS WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO PASS” was posted, causing confusion among the crews as they prepared for the split procedure. At that time, the running order was as follows #1. HAM; #two. SEE and #3. Carlos Sainz, Ferrari (S. Pérez had retired). Several radio exchanges took place between Red Bull and Race Direction (see details on page 4).
4. At 18:31:01 local time, with the race on lap 57/58 and the safety car still on the track, the track was clear and the message “CARS 4 (NOR) – 14 (ALO) – 31 (OCO) – 16 (LEC) – 5 (VET) MAY PASS THE SAFETY CAR” (i.e. only the five lapped cars between HAM and VER) was posted on timing page 3 and in the official timing system. messages. Three other lapped cars remained behind VER (Car 3 (Ricciardo), Car 18 (Stroll) and Car 47 (Mick Schumacher). These three cars had no instructions to overtake VER or any other cars, and did not do so. Mercedes did an observation to Race Direction by radio (see details on page 4).
5. Subsequently, Race Direction notified the teams (on lap 57/58) of the following: “SAFETY CAR ON THIS LAP”.
6. At 18:32 local time, with the race entering lap 58 (the final lap), the messages “TRACK CLEAR” and “TRACK SECTION CLEAR 18” were posted. That allowed for green-flag racing conditions on the final lap.
7. On lap 58/58, VER passed HAM at turn 5 and took the lead of the race. At Turn 9, HAM almost touched VER when trying to overtake him, but VER stayed ahead and crossed the finish line first. HAM crossed the finish line in second place.
8. At 18:33 local time, the message “CHECKED FLAG” was published.
B) Protests, hearings and decisions of the Commissioners
9. At 19:01 local time, Mercedes submitted two protest notices pursuant to article 17 of the 2021 Formula 1 Sporting Regulations (F1 Sporting Regulations) and articles 13.1 to 13.5 of the 2021 International Sporting Code (F1 Sporting Regulations). ). The first protest alleged a breach of article 48.8 of the F1 Sporting Regulations on the basis that VER had overtaken HAM during the safety car period. The second protest alleged that article 48.12 of the F1 Sporting Regulations had been breached during the Race, and requested an amendment to the Race Classification as a result (the Protest).
10. At 19:45 local time, the representatives of the Mercedes and Red Bull teams were summoned by the Stewards for the following reason: “Protest by the Mercedes-AMG PETRONAS Formula One team against car 33, alleged infringement of article 48.8 of the 2021 FIA Formula One Sporting Regulations” (i.e. car 33 (VER) would have overtaken car 44 (HAM) during the Safety Car period at 18:32).
11. At 20:45 local time, the representatives of the Mercedes and Red Bull teams were summoned by the Stewards for the following reason: “Mercedes-AMG Petronas F1 Team protest against the classification established at the end of the competition, alleged infraction of article 48.12 of the 2021 FIA Sporting Regulations”.
12. At 10:14 p.m. local time, after listening to the representatives of the two F1 teams involved, the Stewards issued Document 57, by which they determined that “although car 33 was located at a given moment, during a period very short time, slightly ahead of car 44, at a time when both cars were accelerating and braking, he fell back behind car 44 and was not ahead when the safety car period ended (i.e. in the line). Accordingly, the protest is dismissed.”
13. At 23:03 local time, after listening to representatives of Mercedes and Red Bull (as an “interested party”) and the Race Director, the Stewards issued Document 58 (the Decision) by which they determined that “article 15.3 allows the Clerk of the Course to control the use of the safety car, which in our opinion includes its deployment and withdrawal. That although article 48.12 may not have been fully applied, in relation to the return of the car to the pits at the end of the next lap, article 48.13 overrides it and once the “Safety Car on this lap” message has been displayed, it is mandatory to remove the safety car at the end of that lap. Despite Mercedes’ request that the Stewards correct the matter by amending qualifying to reflect the positions at the end of the penultimate lap, this is a step which the Stewards feel effectively shortens the race in retrospect, and therefore not appropriate. Accordingly, the protest is dismissed.”
14. At 23:22 local time, within one hour of the publication of the Decision (see article 15 of the International Sporting Code and article 10.1.1 of the FIA Judicial and Disciplinary Regulations), Mercedes notified in writing the Stewards of their intention to appeal the Stewards’ decision in relation to the Article 48.12 Protest. The deadline for submitting this appeal to the FIA’s International Court of Appeal (ICA) was December 16, 2021, at 8:22 p.m. CET.
15. Mercedes did not file a notice of appeal within the deadline (or at any time thereafter), but publicly confirmed on December 16, 2021 that she was withdrawing her appeal.
II. KEY ISSUES AND CONCLUSIONS
As the WMSC confirmed in its statement on December 15, 2021, the purpose of the detailed analysis and clarification exercise was to identify any lessons that could be learned from the events that took place at the 2021 Abu Dhabi GP and to consider how best to to provide clarity to F1 participants, fans and the media regarding the rules and regulations of Formula 1 in the future.
1. Multiple roles and responsibilities of the Race Director
16. The role of the Race Director is, by nature, demanding and high pressure. However, a recurring theme in the detailed analysis and clarification exercise was the concern that the number of race director roles and responsibilities that have accumulated over the years could be adding additional pressure to the role.
17. From 1997 to 2019, the role of Race Director was played by Charlie Whiting. In addition to the position of Race Director, Mr. Whiting simultaneously held the positions of FIA Safety Delegate, Permanent Start Judge and Single Seater Sporting Director. Following the passing of Mr. Whiting in March 2019, Michael Masi was appointed as the new Race Director. Mr Masi had previously held the role of Deputy Race Director for F1, F2 and F3 since 2018. Mr Masi also took over from Mr Whiting as Safety Delegate and (from 2021) Sporting Director. of single-seaters.
18. Suggestions from the F1 Commission and interviewees include that some of the Clerk of the Course responsibilities be split up and assigned to other people to reduce the workload of the Clerk of the Course and allow him to focus on his key functions, including race management and control.
2. Radio communications between the F1 teams and the Race Director
19. Radio communications between the F1 teams and the Race Director was identified as another key issue during the analysis.
20. Direct radio communications between F1 teams and Race Direction were made public from the start of the 2021 season as part of a broader media strategy. It should be noted that only a part of the exchanges were made public.
21. After the 2021 Abu Dhabi GP, the media and public debate focused on the communications between the race director and the Red Bull team manager, on the one hand, and the race director and the director of the Mercedes team, on the other, especially in the conversations that took place during the last laps of the race.
22. On lap 56/58, after the message “NO LAPED CARS WILL BE ALLOWED TO PASS” was posted, the conversation between Red Bull team boss ( Christian Horner ) / Red Bull team sporting director ( Jonathan Wheatley ) and race control (Michael Masi) was as follows:
- Crew Chief: Christian to Michael
- Race Director: Yes, go ahead Christian.
- Crew Chief: Why aren’t we getting these bent cars out of the way?
- Race Director: Just give me… because Christian… just give me a second… Ok, my main, the important thing is to clean up this incident.
- Crew Chief: You only need one competition lap.
- Race Director: Yes.
- Sporting Director: Obviously, those lapped cars, we must not let them pass… they immediately turn around and reach the back of the group.
- Race Director: Understood.
- Sporting Director: You need to let them go….
- Race Director: Understood. Just give us a second.
- Sporting Director: …And then we will have a car race on our hands.
- Race Director: Understood.
23. On lap 57/58, after posting the message “LAPED CARS 4 (NOR) – 14 (ALO) – 31 (OCO) – 16 (LEC) – 5 (VET) CAN OVERTAKE THE SAFETY CAR”, the Mercedes team boss (Toto Wolff) radioed Race Direction:
- Crew Chief: Michael…Michael, this is not right. Michael, that’s not good at all. That is not good at all. [later]
- The Crew Chief said, incorrectly: He [SEE] just overtook under the safety car.
24. Much of the debate therefore centered around the purpose and appropriateness of such communications and whether in-race communications between F1 teams and the Clerk of the Course should be broadcast or even allowed.
25. The consensus of the participants who have taken part in the detailed analysis and clarification exercise was that the respective communications to the Race Director by the Red Bull Racing and Mercedes team bosses during the last laps of the Abu Dhabi GP of 2021 had a negative impact on the good development of the last laps because they were distracting when the Race Director had to focus on making difficult decisions and against the clock.
26. Indeed, when the safety car is taken out on the track, the Clerk of the Course must especially monitor the cars on the track, the order in which they are placed, the display of the corresponding flags, the development of the intervention of the marshals and then, if the Track Manager considers that the conditions allow it, order the safety car to leave the track.
27. Therefore, the Race Director must manage both the cars on the track, the intervention of the safety car and what happens at the scene of the incident, that is, a considerable number of tasks that have to be carried out in a minimum time to allow the race to resume safely and as soon as possible, while also responding to the demands of the team managers. This requires immense concentration.
28. Therefore, it was considered that these communications were not necessary or useful for the proper development of the career. Rather, the consensus was that they add pressure to the Clerk of the Course at a critical moment (i.e., at a time when the Clerk of the Course must simultaneously monitor the cars on the track, the deployment of the appropriate flags, and the progress of the marshals in cleaning the track, and also being the liaison with the Track Manager in relation to the end of the safety car period) and could try to influence (either directly or indirectly, or intentionally or not) in decisions made by the Race Director.
29. Taking the above into account, the consensus of those who participated in the detailed analysis and clarification exercise was that communications between (on the one hand) the F1 teams and (on the other) the race director during a race should be restricted to that the race director can carry out his crucial role without unnecessary interruptions or distractions.
3. The procedure of splitting during the safety car
30. The procedure of splitting during the safety car was a central topic of discussion during the detailed analysis and clarification exercise, stemming from the misunderstanding about the application of this procedure at the 2021 Abu Dhabi GP, in accordance with articles 48.12 and 48.13 of the F1 Sporting Regulations.
31. It appears from the analysis that there may be different interpretations of article 48.12 and/or article 48.13, and that this is likely to have contributed to some of the confusion surrounding the safety car removal procedure. Therefore, it was felt that these provisions of the F1 Sporting Regulations would benefit from clarification.
32. It was also considered that decisions regarding the safety car at the end of the 2021 Abu Dhabi GP were likely to have taken into account previous discussions (including meetings of the F1 SAC, F1 Commission and team principals). of F1) that made clear the preference of F1 teams to finish races with a green flag, rather than behind a safety car, when it was safe to do so. Consultation with F1 drivers confirmed that it is still desirable to finish a race under green flag, but that safety must always come first. If for safety reasons it is not possible to remove the safety car, the F1 teams confirmed that they would agree to finish the race under safety car conditions.
33. The process of identifying bent cars used to be a manual process. For the 2022 season, software has been developed that will automate the communication of the list of cars that must be split.
34. In a recent electronic vote, the WMSC has confirmed a rule change that clarifies that in the event of a split, “all” cars, rather than “any” cars, have to do so. Further investigation of F1’s timing system will clarify whether a “virtual splitting” procedure could bring advantages and simplification.
35. The results of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Grand Prix and the FIA Formula One World Championship are valid, final and cannot be changed now. In accordance with the regulations, Mercedes lodged a protest with the stewards after the race, seeking to change the classification of the race. The stewards dismissed the protest and Mercedes then had the opportunity to appeal that decision to the FIA International Court of Appeal, but did not. There are no other mechanisms available in the regulations to modify the classification of the race.
4. Structure of the FIA race management team
36. Participants in the analysis identified the support available to the race management team as a key issue, in the context of ensuring that the race director is able to carry out their role to the best of their ability.
37. Responsibility for supporting the race management team rests primarily with the FIA single-seater department. When asked about their support, department staff noted that the team was positive and worked well together. They noted the demanding nature of the Clerk of the Course role, especially given the multiple roles and responsibilities of the Clerk of the Course. They also pointed out the need for additional support and resources to improve the functioning of the department and therefore better support the Race Direction team.
38. In addition, staff identified a need to improve communication between the FIA Geneva office and track staff, and between F1’s sporting and technical departments. They also noted the complexity of the F1 regulations (in particular the F1 Technical Regulations, the accompanying Technical Directives and the F1 Financial Regulations) and the reduction in the duration of consultancy agreements from 3 years to 1. year, often leading to higher staff turnover and therefore less familiarity with the rules.
IV. THE RECOMMENDATIONS
39. The recommendations to address the findings and conclusions of this report are set out below. These recommendations have been presented by the FIA President to both the F1 Commission and the WMSC, and were publicly announced in a statement by the FIA President published on 17 February 2022.
Recommendation 1: To help the Race Director in the decision-making process, a Virtual Race Direction Room will be created. Like the Video Assistance Referee (VAR) in football, he will be stationed in one of the FIA’s offices for off-circuit backup. Connected in real time with the FIA Race Director of F1, you will help apply the Sporting Regulations using the most modern technological tools.
Recommendation 2: Direct radio communications during the race, which are currently broadcast live on all televisions, will be eliminated to protect the Clerk of the Course from any pressure and allow them to make decisions with peace of mind. It will still be possible to ask the Clerk of the Course questions, following a well-defined and non-intrusive process.
Recommendation 3: The splitting procedures behind the safety car should be re-evaluated by the F1 Sporting Advisory Committee and presented to the next F1 Commission before the start of the season.
Recommendation 4: A new race management team has been put in place from the test session in Barcelona. Niels Wittich (former DTM race director) and Eduardo Freitas (former WEC race director) will alternate as race director, assisted by Herbie Blash (former right-hand man of Charlie Whiting) as permanent senior adviser.
40. Many improvements have already been made, such as staff additions and the division of the many functions and tasks of the Clerk of the Course. In addition, in December 2021, the role of Executive Director of the single-seater department was created within the FIA, which Peter Bayer performs in addition to his role as Secretary General for Sport.
41. However, to finalize the new structure:
– A new F1 Sporting Director will be hired (process completed),
– An additional senior regulatory legal adviser will be hired to strengthen legal support (i) during F1 competitions (irrespective of time difference) and especially during the weekend and (ii) in F1 sporting matters F1.
42. It is suggested that all recommendations that have not yet been implemented be implemented as a matter of priority, so that the lessons learned from the detailed analysis and clarification exercise for the 2022 season can be fully exploited. WMSC members regularly informed of progress made.
